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UNION DUES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR:  LEGISLATIVE 
CHANGES AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 
By, Ann C. Hodges 
Ann C. Hodges is Professor of Law at the University of Richmond.  She is the author of numerous articles 
and book chapters and coauthor of two books, Public Sector Employment: Cases and Materials (West 
2010) and Principles of Employment Law (West 2009).  She is a member of The Labor Law Group and 
of the editorial board of Employee Rights & Employment Policy Journal.  She joined the University of 
Richmond faculty in 1988 after practicing law with Katz, Friedman, Schur and Eagle in Chicago.  This 
article was based in part on a longer article previously published in the Employee Rights and 
Employment Policy Journal entitled Maintaining Union Resources in an Era of Public Sector Bargaining 
Retrenchment, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 599 (2012). 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
The economic crisis that began in 2008 led many states and localities to look for 
ways to reduce labor costs, which form a substantial portion of government 
budgets.  Some state legislatures focused on collective bargaining laws, with 
Wisconsin being the most high profile example.  Along with the restrictions on 
bargaining,[1] a number of states moved to limit the collection of union dues.  The 
limitations were not across the board, but primarily directed at either political 
expenditures of unions or at particular unions, most commonly education 
unions.  Not surprisingly, the laws enacted were immediately subjected to legal 
challenge since unions, like every other organization, depend on finances to 
operate. This article will review the newly enacted legislation relating to union 
dues, the resulting legal challenges, and the law on which they are based.  It will 
also highlight countervailing trends in some states and discuss the Supreme 
Court’s 2012 decision in Knox v. Service Employees International Union Local 
1000[2] which portends additional possible restrictions on unions’ ability to 
collect dues.  The article will end with an analysis of why the legislative focus on 
union dues, which have virtually no direct impact on government budgets, and a 
discussion of the implications of these developments for the future. This is an area 
of law that is in flux and bears watching, as it will impact the survival of unions and 
stable labor relations.[3] 
II.  THE LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Litigation over union dues is ubiquitous, in part because of the role played by the 
Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, which has an express purpose of 
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litigating issues relating to union dues in order to prevent unions from requiring 
employees to pay them.[4] A series of Supreme Court cases have set the 
parameters of the law.  The First Amendment free speech provisions and the 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection clause have formed the basis of most of 
the challenges. 
The First Amendment limits the ability of unions to collect dues from objecting 
employees.  Unions may require payments from employees who are not voluntary 
members of the union only in states that authorize unions to charge the costs of 
representation to all employees that they are required to represent.  These states 
either require payment by statute or expressly permit unions and employers to 
negotiate agreements mandating payment.  The purposes for which these fair 
share or agency fees can be used are limited by the First Amendment to activities 
related to collective bargaining; they may not be spent on “ideological activities 
unrelated to collective bargaining.”[5] Objectors can prevent the use of their fees 
for these nonchargeable expenditures and have the right to challenge the union’s 
determination as to which expenditures are chargeable.[6] Further, states may 
constitutionally prevent unions from using agency fees of nonmembers for political 
purposes without their consent.[7] 
The Supreme Court has also addressed First Amendment and Equal Protection 
challenges to state law limits on payroll deduction of dues and agency fees.  Such 
dues checkoffs make it much easier for the union to collect dues and 
fees.  In Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, the Court rejected a First 
Amendment challenge to Idaho’s law barring deduction of employees’ dues used 
for political purposes, stating that the law merely declined to assist in promoting 
speech and did not actively abridge the employees’ freedom of speech. [8] As a 
result, the state need only show a rational basis for its decision, and the desire to 
avoid entanglement in partisan politics satisfied that standard.[9] That the law 
might reduce funds available to the union was of no moment in the absence of a 
direct abridgement of speech.[10] 
In City of Charlotte v. Local 660, International Association of Firefighters, the 
Supreme Court upheld the city’s refusal to deduct union dues despite the fact that 
it granted deduction requests for other purposes.[11] The Court held that the city’s 
established standards for determining which dues deduction requests it would 
grant met the rational basis test.[12] 
The city has determined that it will provide withholding only for programs of general interest in 
which all city or departmental employees can, without more, participate. Employees can 
participate in the union checkoff only if they join an outside organization the union. Thus, Local 
660 does not fit the category of groups for which the city will withhold. We cannot say that denying 
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withholding to associational or special interest groups that claim only some departmental 
employees as members and that employees must first join before being eligible to participate in 
the checkoff marks an arbitrary line so devoid of reason as to violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
Rather, this division seems a reasonable method for providing the benefit of withholding to 
employees in their status as employees, while limiting the number of instances of withholding and 
the financial and administrative burdens attendant thereon.[13] 
Ysursa and City of Charlotte indicate that complete bans on dues deduction, 
whether for political purposes or generally, are likely to survive legal challenge. Yet 
if the employer distinguishes among organizations in application of its dues policy, 
it must at least have a rational basis for such distinctions. Additionally, while the 
government may freely decline to assist or fund citizen speech, it may not do so for 
reasons based on viewpoint.[14] Dues deduction bans that apply to some groups 
of employees and organizations and not others are vulnerable to legal 
challenge.[15] 
Applying these principles, lower courts have upheld policies that limit payroll 
deduction to unions that are majority representatives as justified by goals of labor 
peace and stability.[16] For similar reasons, courts have upheld numerosity 
requirements that limit payroll deduction to unions with larger 
memberships.[17] In South Carolina Education Ass’n v. Campbell, the Fourth 
Circuit upheld a law which barred dues deductions for all membership 
organizations except one open to all state employees.[18] The court recognized 
several rational bases for the limit, including the administrative and financial 
burdens of deducting dues for every requesting organization and fostering healthy 
employment relations with the state’s employees through the organization open to 
all.[19] Where termination of dues checkoff is in retaliation for the exercise of 
speech and associational rights, however, it may violate the First Amendment, 
although the employer need not provide the checkoff in the first instance.[20] With 
this background, the article will next look at the limitations enacted in 2011 and 
2012. 
III.  DUES LIMITATIONS OF 2011 AND 2012 
With the revolutionary changes in public sector bargaining laws in recent years 
came changes in dues laws as well.  Both Alabama and Arizona enacted limitations 
on dues deductions for political purposes.[21] Wisconsin eliminated fair share and 
payroll deduction of dues for all except public safety employees.[22] Michigan and 
North Carolina eliminated payroll deduction for education employees.[23] Many 
other states proposed similar limitations.[24] In addition, the enactment of right 
to work legislation will bar negotiation of fair share agreements in Indiana and 
Michigan.[25] 
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The payroll deduction limitations in Alabama, Arizona, Michigan, North Carolina 
and Wisconsin were all enjoined on constitutional grounds.   One of the Wisconsin 
cases was recently reversed by the Seventh Circuit, and the Sixth Circuit just 
reversed the Michigan case.[26] These decisions and the specifics of the laws 
enjoined will be discussed below. 
A. Deductions for Political Purposes 
The Alabama law limits public employee payroll deductions for political activity or 
for membership dues for organizations that use such dues for political 
activity.[27] This prohibition appears narrower than a total ban, but in effect may 
discourage all dues deductions because of criminal sanctions imposed for violation 
of the law and the inability of individual employees to control the use of their dues. 
The Alabama law also requires the membership organizations to certify and prove 
each year that none of the membership dues were spent on political activity. 
Failure to do so or false submission would terminate the organization’s ability to 
obtain dues deduction. 
The Alabama law was enjoined based on a First Amendment challenge in Alabama 
Education Association v. Bentley,[28] which found the statute overbroad and 
vague. The Eleventh Circuit narrowed the injunction, however, allowing the law to 
take effect so long as it applied only to dues deductions for electioneering activities, 
certifying to the Alabama Supreme Court questions about the scope of the 
statute.[29] Subsequently, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ equal 
protection and viewpoint discrimination claims but declined to dismiss the claims 
of retaliation for constitutionally protected speech, which are currently in the 
discovery process.[30] 
The Arizona law requires organizations accepting dues through payroll deduction 
to certify that none of the dues are used for political purposes or to specify the 
percentage used for political purposes, with a substantial fine if the predicted 
percentage is exceeded.[31] It also requires a special written authorization from 
employees, renewed annually, to have deducted dues used for political purposes. 
The law exempts charitable organizations, employee benefits organizations, and 
organizations of public safety officers from its provisions.  The Arizona law was 
preliminarily, and then permanently, enjoined on First Amendment grounds 
because it was not uniformly applied to unions and other organizations that could 
use funds for political purposes and therefore, was not viewpoint neutral.[32] 
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B.  Deductions of Full Dues for Certain Unions 
Legislatures in Michigan, North Carolina and Wisconsin banned deduction of all 
dues for identified unions, with Wisconsin also eliminating fair share 
agreements.  In Michigan and North Carolina, the ban applied only to education 
unions, while in Wisconsin, it applied to general employee unions, but not public 
safety employee unions, which were defined in the statute.[33] The District Court 
for the Eastern District of Michigan enjoined the legislation from taking effect, 
concluding that the union plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of both 
their Equal Protection and First Amendment claims.[34] The court found no 
rational basis for the legislation, suggesting that it appeared to be directed at 
limiting the power and speech of a politically unpopular group based on 
viewpoint.  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the defendants’ motion for a 
stay of the district court’s injunction but subsequently reversed the district court’s 
decision, finding no viewpoint discrimination.[35] The North Carolina Superior 
Court issued a temporary restraining order, and later preliminary and permanent 
injunctions, preventing the legislation from taking effect on both procedural and 
substantive constitutional grounds, the latter retaliatory viewpoint 
discrimination.[36] 
The legal path of the Wisconsin statute is more complex.  Lawsuits were filed in 
both state and federal court.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected a procedural 
challenge to the statute based on the state constitution,[37] while the federal 
district court and a state trial court both found the dues deduction provisions of 
the statute unconstitutional based on the unjustifiable distinction between general 
and public safety unions.[38] The federal district court upheld the limitation of fair 
share provisions to public safety employees while the state trial court found the 
entire law unconstitutional in one case. The decision of the federal district court 
was recently reversed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the 
statute in its entirety.[39] 
C.  Legislative Patterns 
There is an unmistakable pattern in these legislative actions which led to initial 
court victories for unions challenging their constitutionality.  Most of the laws 
apply to some but not all unions, burdening the speech of the disfavored 
organizations.  Most of the laws were enacted using surreptitious and unusual, and 
sometimes improper, legislative tactics.  Additionally, most targeted particular 
unions that had recently engaged in political activities in opposition to proponents 
of the legislation. And finally, in most cases, leaders of the legislative body made 
public statements suggesting political reasons for the legislation. These common 
elements, which will be discussed in more detail below, supported the argument 
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that the motivation for the dues deduction bans was either suppression of certain 
political views or retaliation for political activity or both. 
Except for the Alabama statute, the laws target some, but not all unions. The 
Arizona and Wisconsin bills except public safety unions from the ban, while 
Michigan and North Carolina barred deductions only for education unions.  In 
North Carolina, only the North Carolina Association of Educators was affected, 
because the authorizing legislation permitted deductions only for unions with a 
specified level of membership.  This distinction between unions alone led the 
Arizona court to enjoin enforcement of the statute.[40] 
A brief description of the enactment of the legislation in the other four states will 
demonstrate the remainder of the legislative pattern.  In Alabama, the court 
allowed the claim of retaliatory viewpoint discrimination to proceed, noting that 
the plaintiff, Alabama Education Association, had repeatedly clashed with the 
Governor on political issues and then subsequently supported an opponent to his 
chosen successor in the Republican primary.[41] The Governor announced that 
the organization should stay out of the primary and two days later the state 
comptroller decided to stop the longstanding practice of making payroll 
deductions for political action committees, a decision for which the Governor took 
credit.  After the election, which resulted in a Republican sweep of the legislature 
and governorship, the legislation at issue, which codified the practice instituted by 
the comptroller, was enacted. 
In Michigan, the legislation had lain dormant for months.[42] It was resurrected 
and passed using a suspension of rules in both chambers within hours of the 
union’s announcement of a political campaign to obtain a constitutional 
amendment protecting collective bargaining.[43] According to the complaint, the 
decision to seek the constitutional amendment followed a series of legislative 
enactments curbing collective bargaining rights and reducing the benefits of school 
employees, which triggered a political response by the union, including a recall 
effort directed at the primary sponsor of the legislation.[44] The complaint also 
quotes the Speaker of the House stating that the union has “declared war” by 
promoting recalls and the Senate Majority Leader as saying “[t]he teachers union 
specifically the Michigan Education Association have lost their (sic) way and public 
school employees should no longer be forced to join them.”[45] 
The court enjoined the legislation, finding the action was likely to succeed on the 
merits because the legislation had no rational basis; instead it appeared to be 
motivated by a desire to limit the political power of an unpopular group by limiting 
their ability to speak. The court rejected the asserted cost rationale for the law, 
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noting that the legislature had found the cost was negligible.[46] In these days of 
computer payroll systems, the cost of adding deductions is far less than in earlier 
times and, as the Michigan court recognized, may no longer be sufficient to justify 
limitations.   The court of appeals reversed, over a strong dissent, finding no 
likelihood of success on the merits.  The court found no viewpoint discrimination 
since the legislation was directed at school employers not unions, and the 
deduction process was neither speech nor a nonpublic forum.[47] 
The North Carolina legislation followed a path similar to that of Michigan.  Despite 
numerous legislative sessions and a Senate override vote, the House of 
Representatives failed for months to consider overriding the Governor’s veto of the 
legislation, which was scheduled to take effect July 1, 2011.[48] Then in January 
2012, after a late night veto session called for the sole purpose of considering 
another vetoed bill, the House adjourned and reconvened to override the 
Governor’s veto on the dues deduction bill at 12:45 a.m.[49] The Speaker of the 
House was quoted as stating that the legislation was prompted by the Association’s 
mailings targeting Democrats who had voted with Republicans on the state budget, 
and  he subsequently acknowledged that the organization’s politics were a factor 
in the legislation.[50] As in the case of Michigan, these statements reflect the 
strategic timing of the legislation, in direct response to political activity by the 
Association.  The permanent injunction was based on “retaliatory viewpoint 
discrimination.”[51] 
Finally, the highly publicized Wisconsin legislation reveals a similar pattern.  It 
was peculiarly structured using unprecedented classifications that targeted unions 
which did not support the governor’s election, while preserving dues deduction for 
unions that supported the Governor.[52] Statements by State Senate Majority 
Leader Scott Fitzgerald were even clearer than those in Michigan and North 
Carolina regarding the intent to suppress political views. Fitzgerald stated, 
If we win this battle [over the passage of the Act], and the money is not there under the auspices 
of the unions, certainly what you’re going to find is President Obama is going to have a . . . much 
more difficult time getting elected and winning the state of Wisconsin.[53] 
As in Michigan and North Carolina, quick votes and limited opportunities for 
public input at hearings characterized the legislative process. Initial efforts to pass 
the legislation surfaced quickly and surprised advocates, resulting in the escape of 
the Democratic legislators to Illinois to avoid passage.[54] The actual passage 
involved parliamentary maneuvers that were challenged as violative of the Open 
Meetings Law and state constitutional provisions requiring open hearings.[55]
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There were several legal challenges to the law. The federal district court, analyzing 
the equal protection claim, found that there was no rational basis for the 
differential treatment of general unions and public safety unions with respect to 
dues deduction, rejecting as unpersuasive the rationale of preventing strikes by 
public safety employees.[56] The court noted that the law allowed public safety 
unions to collect fair share fees from objecting employees, while barring general 
unions from using payroll deduction to collect fees from voluntary members, 
suggesting that this result seemed particularly unlikely to further the goal of 
deterring strikes among public safety employees.[57] Further, the court found that 
the only apparent rationale for the distinction among unions was to suppress the 
speech of the general unions; consequently, the law violated the First 
Amendment.[58] The court did not find that the limitations on collective 
bargaining, which included a bar to negotiating fair share agreements, violated the 
constitution.[59] The court found fear of public safety strikes a more persuasive 
justification for this part of the law.[60] By way of contrast, the Dane County 
Circuit Court found the entire statute unconstitutional on both First Amendment 
and Equal Protection grounds because the distinctions between unions burdened 
the speech and association rights of some employees, but not others, without 
adequate justification.[61] 
The Seventh Circuit panel rejected the analysis of the lower court on the dues issue, 
upholding the entire law.[62] The majority opinion found that dues deduction is a 
subsidy of speech and, thus, differential treatment of speakers is permissible 
unless the classification on the basis of speaker identity is inherently based on 
viewpoint.[63] The court concluded there was no reason to assume that different 
unions have different viewpoints.[64] Neither the disproportionate impact on 
groups with a particular view (Governor Walker’s opponents), nor the expressed 
political purpose of one member of the legislature established a motive of 
viewpoint discrimination.   Having found no viewpoint discrimination, the court 
then applied a rational basis test to the entire statute and concluded that the 
interest in labor peace among essential employees was rational even if the 
classifications may have been imperfectly suited to that purpose.[65] It refused to 
probe the motivations of the legislature and, indeed, suggested that politically 
motivated legislation was a reality of the democratic system.[66] 
Judge Hamilton dissented as to the finding regarding the dues deduction, while 
agreeing that the “flimsy” rationale of the state was sufficient for the “deferential 
rational basis” review of the remainder of the statute.[67] Judge Hamilton 
concluded that once the state offered dues deduction it was not just a subsidy of 
speech but, instead, the dues deduction system became a nonpublic forum, which 
had to be viewpoint neutral.[68] Judge Hamilton, like the district court but unlike 
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the majority, was willing to look behind the facial viewpoint neutrality.[69] Three 
factors convinced Judge Hamilton that the law was not viewpoint neutral.   First, 
Judge Hamilton found a lack of fit between the purpose of labor peace and the 
classification, resulting in the protection of dues deduction for unions that 
endorsed Walker and denial to those that did not.[70] For example, corrections 
officers, Capitol Police and the University of Wisconsin Police, who have important 
public safety responsibilities, were considered general employees, while the Motor 
Vehicle Inspectors, whose association endorsed Governor Walker, were 
considered public safety employees whose strike would endanger the 
public.[71] Relatedly, and for the same reason, Judge Hamilton found the state’s 
justifications for the classification weak, since a strike by corrections officers would 
be far more damaging than a strike by Motor Vehicle Inspectors.[72] Finally, the 
Fitzgerald statement revealing a political purpose was the third factor that 
persuaded Judge Hamilton that the ostensible neutrality masked a motive of 
viewpoint suppression.[73] 
The Seventh Circuit’s disposition is not the final word on the Wisconsin legislation 
as litigation in the state courts[74] and before the Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Commission is ongoing.  If the rationale of the panel majority is accepted 
in other jurisdictions, however, many, if not all, recent dues limitations could be 
upheld as constitutional.[75] Before turning to the future, however, a brief review 
of other legislation relating to dues is helpful. 
IV.  RIGHT TO WORK LAWS 
Legislation regarding dues is not limited to bans or partial bans on dues deduction 
or elimination of fair share legislation.  Both Indiana and Michigan adopted right 
to work laws in the last year, which prohibit public and private employee unions 
from negotiating fair share or agency shop agreements.[76] Like the dues 
deduction and fair share legislation discussed above, these laws restrict the ability 
of unions to fund their activities because unions are still required by law to 
represent all employees in their bargaining units where collective bargaining 
legislation exists.  A constitutional challenge to the Indiana law was recently 
rejected,[77] while a challenge to the Michigan law is pending.[78] 
V.  STATE ACTIONS FAVORING UNION DUES COLLECTION 
Not all recent state actions regarding union dues have imposed restrictions on 
unions, however.  California voters rejected a 2012 ballot referendum to ban 
payroll deduction of political contributions.[79] While applying to both 
corporations and unions, it was widely agreed that unions would suffer far more if 
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the referendum passed because they rely far more heavily on payroll deduction for 
political funding than businesses.[80] In 2011, Maryland state employees began 
paying fair share fees for the first time under a law enacted in 2009.[81] New 
Hampshire has twice rejected proposals to enact a right to work law.[82] In 
addition, other state legislatures have entertained proposals to require fair share 
or payroll deduction of dues.[83] 
This review of the recent legislation and the cases challenging these new laws 
provides clues as to the reasons for their passage. We turn to this in the next 
section. 
VI.  WHY UNION DUES? 
One might ask why union dues have drawn such attention in recent years.  While 
critics have branded collection of union dues as a self-interested grab for power 
and money,[84] the simple truth is that unions, like any other organization, cannot 
accomplish their purpose without resources. The sophistication of employers, the 
complexity of benefit programs such as pension and health insurance plans, the 
size and intricacy of governmental budgets, and the powerful anti-tax and anti-
government lobbies, among other things, require a sophisticated and powerful 
union to accomplish the goals and protect the interests of public 
employees.[85] Labor unions have limited ability to raise funds from sources other 
than their members, or where fair share applies, from all employees they 
represent.  Accordingly, dues are necessary to permit the organization to continue 
to operate. 
Payroll deduction is important because it provides an effective mechanism for dues 
collection that requires only a single authorization from the employee. Once an 
employee authorizes payroll deduction, an employer deducts dues each pay period 
and remits them to the union. In the absence of payroll deduction, unions must 
establish independent mechanisms for dues collection, and no other method is as 
effective as payroll deduction.  Data demonstrates that even where membership is 
already voluntary, elimination of payroll deduction can result in substantial losses 
in dues payment and membership.[86] The union must then expend resources on 
organization and dues collection that might otherwise be spent on activities that 
directly benefit the bargaining unit. 
Thus, union dues are important to fund both the union’s representational and 
political activities.  While opponents often object to the political activity of unions, 
in the public sector union political activity can directly impact the terms and 
conditions of employment of the employees the union represents.[87] For 
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example, increased government funding makes more money available for 
government employees’ wages and benefits or additional staffing to reduce their 
workload.  Additionally, political action can directly impact the working conditions 
of employees.  Longer school days and larger classes affect teacher workloads, as 
does the number of police officers assigned to a shift or the number of firefighters 
to a truck.  Yet it is precisely the power to influence such decisions that leads to 
opposition to public sector unions. 
Opponents of unions in general and of public sector bargaining in particular see 
the funding limitations created by the economic crisis as an opportunity to limit 
the power of public sector unions. The Right to Work Committee and the National 
Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation have long been active in this role in both 
the public and private sectors, but in recent years they have been joined by 
conservative groups arguing that the power of public sector unions is detrimental 
to the public interest. When the economic storm hit, devastating state and local 
government budgets, these conservative groups seized the opportunity to push for 
legislation limiting bargaining and dues collection. Model legislation developed by 
the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and the policy papers and 
proposals of other conservative think tank organizations reveal the goal of the 
elimination of mandatory collective bargaining, fair share, and payroll deduction 
of union dues.[88] Additionally, political rhetoric and research from conservative 
organizations and politicians have focused heavily on teachers and their unions as 
impediments to education reform.[89] These conservative groups frequently cite 
the size, power, and political spending of the National Education Association, the 
largest union in the country,[90] as an obstacle to educational change.[91] Finally, 
there is the pure political reality that unions lean heavily Democratic and any 
impairment of their ability to collect funds benefits Republican and conservative 
causes.[92] Given these facts, along with Republican successes in state level 
elections in 2010, the emergence of strikingly similar legislative campaigns 
directed at union dues, particularly of the teachers’ unions, is not 
surprising.[93] Having reviewed the current status of the law, and the reasons for 
the importance of the issue to both unions and their opponents, we look next to 
what the future holds. 
VII.  THE FUTURE 
The legal battles over existing legislation are likely to continue.  It seems unlikely, 
however, that the union plaintiffs will petition for U.S. Supreme Court review of 
any losing decision, although the defendants well might.  Unions have been largely 
unsuccessful in the Supreme Court in recent dues cases and the rhetoric from some 
justices suggests an inclination to restrict dues collection even further.[94] Last 
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term, in Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, the Court 
rejected the union’s argument that it did not need to send an additional notice to 
members regarding a mid-year special assessment, providing them the 
opportunity to object to any political spending included.[95] The Court also 
reached out to decide an issue neither briefed nor argued by the parties.[96] The 
Court determined that the union could not charge objectors the percentage of the 
assessment that represented chargeable expenses from the previous year, even 
though this prevented the union from collecting the full cost of 
representation.[97] Even more striking, the Court ruled that nonmembers could 
not be charged the assessment at all unless they opted in, instead of applying the 
opt out rule used in all prior cases.[98] This was a position that was not even 
advocated by the petitioners.[99] The majority opinion extensively discussed and 
critiqued longstanding precedent, under which unions were allowed to charge 
nonmembers the cost of representation unless the employees opted out of the 
charges.[100]The Court did not overrule these decisions, however.[101] While 
the Knox decision has been criticized as at odds with other First Amendment cases 
such as Citizens United,[102] the Court’s disposition in Knox may foreshadow a 
future Court decision that limits the ability of a union to charge nonmembers the 
cost of representation absent the nonmember’s consent. 
Depending on the political winds, additional legislation may impair or assist 
unions in their ability to collect dues from their members and other employees that 
they represent.  Although the recent legislation discussed above may be vulnerable 
to legal attack because of the structure and circumstances surrounding passage, it 
is clear from earlier cases that bans on payroll deduction and fair share can be 
structured to meet constitutional requirements, particularly if legislators are 
willing to ban deductions for all unions.  Unions might be well-served to invest in 
alternative methods of dues collection such as automatic credit card charges or 
bank drafts, which are relatively efficient and require a reduced expenditure of 
union resources.  Employees can terminate these deductions more easily than 
employer-based deductions, however, requiring the union to engage in continual 
marketing to convince employees of the value of their union membership.  While 
this too requires investment of funds, such campaigning is essential to union 
survival and effective employee representation in the current political climate, 
where affluent union opponents spend massive sums of money to convince 
employees that unions are not acting in their best interests. 
The future of unions and collective bargaining is closely tied to the ability of unions 
to maintain their funding.  Collective bargaining has predominated historically in 
the United States as a vehicle for employee voice and as an instrument of limiting 
income inequality.[103] In addition, in the public sector, union lobbying can 
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persuade legislators to fund important government initiatives, such as those 
relating to education and law enforcement.  Collective bargaining also has a role to 
play in times of crisis and may lead to creative solutions to governmental 
challenges.  Without a reliable source of funding, the role of unions in collective 
bargaining and in the political process will be diminished.  Severe reductions in the 
ability of unions to facilitate employee participation in the workplace and the 
political process will bring about fundamental changes in the American 
democracy.  Given the power and resources of union opponents and the current 
slide in union membership, accelerated by state legislation, such change is not 
beyond the realm of possibility.  A robust debate about the role of unions in public 
employment is a worthy endeavor for there are strongly held conflicting views. 
However, without a viable labor movement such a debate will be both one-sided 
and meaningless. 
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
BY, STUDENT EDITORIAL BOARD 
Alec Hausermann, Daniel Quist, Ryan Thoma, and Daniel Zapata 
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee Relations 
Report.  It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public 
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the 
public employee collective bargaining statutes. 
I. IELRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Bargaining Units 
In Danville Community Consolidated School District 118 and Danville Education 
Association, IEA-NEA, Case No. 2013-RS-0002-S (IELRB 2013), the IELRB 
certified the proposed merger of two bargaining units, one consisting of teachers 
and teacher aides and another consisting of secretarial and clerical employees even 
though it had previously determined that the teachers did not share a sufficient 
community of interest with the clerical employees to justify the inclusion of both 
groups in a single bargaining unit. 
In 1987, the Danville Education Association filed a petition with the IELRB seeking 
to add non-unionized teacher aides and clerical employees to an existing 
bargaining unit of teachers. In its 1989 Opinion and Order, the IELRB decided that 
such a bargaining unit would be inappropriate, finding that the teachers and 
clerical employees did not share a sufficient community of interest to justify 
including them in the same bargaining unit. The IELRB noted that the Association 
only sought to add a portion of the District’s unrepresented employees to the unit 
and suggested that if the Association had sought to create a “wall-to-wall” 
bargaining unit of all of the District’s unrepresented employees, such a bargaining 
unit might be appropriate because it would increase bargaining efficiency. 
Pursuant to its 1989 Opinion and Order, the IELRB certified the Association as the 
exclusive representative of two distinct bargaining units, one consisting of teachers 
and teacher aides and another of secretarial and clerical employees. In the interim, 
the remaining portions of the District’s workforce were organized. On August 1, 
2012 the Association filed a new representation petition seeking to merge the 
teacher/teacher aide bargaining unit and the clerical bargaining unit into one. 
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The IELRB framed the issue as “whether the situation has changed since our 
previous decision in 1989 so that the unit proposed in this case is now appropriate.” 
Both parties stipulated that the duties of the teachers, teacher aides, and clerical 
employees had not materially changed since the 1989 decision. 
In determining that the merger was appropriate, the IELRB first discussed the fact 
that the District’s remaining employees were now unionized. In its 1989 decision, 
the IELRB declared that “[k]ey to our determination is the fact that the requested 
unit seeks some, but not all, of the District’s remaining employees.” In that case, 
the IELRB declared that in a “residual or wall-to-wall unit” the preference for a 
community of interest within the bargaining unit can be overridden “in order to 
achieve efficiency and to ensure an opportunity for representation for everyone.” 
In this case, the IELRB held that the lack of a community of interest between the 
teachers and clerical staff was less dispositive now that the entirety of the District’s 
staff was unionized, stating, “The unit that is proposed in this case is similar to a 
residual unit in terms of efficiency in bargaining, because it reduces the number of 
units with which the District must bargain. Therefore, a lesser community of 
interest can be acceptable. “ 
The Board next analyzed the parties’ bargaining history, observing that a history 
of coordinated bargaining is a factor leaning in favor of merging two units. The 
record showed that since 1989, the Association and the District had negotiated 
successor collective bargaining agreements for the teacher/teacher aide bargaining 
unit and the clerical bargaining unit “on the same days and at the same time.” THE 
IELRB Found that there existed a history of coordinated bargaining. 
The IELRB relied on Black Hawk College Professional Technical Unit v. IELRB, 
where the Illinois Appellate Court held that when evaluating the proposed merger 
of two bargaining units, the Board is to focus on the similarities of the two units 
instead of the differences. 275 Ill.App.3d 189, 655 N.E.2d 1054 (1st Dist. 1995). 
Further, the Board cited the Appellate Court for the proposition that that IELRA 
does not require that a bargaining unit be the most appropriate unit possible under 
the statute, but only “that the unit be appropriate.” See Sandburg Faculty Ass’n, 
IEA-NEA v. IELRB, 248 Ill.App.3d 1028, 1036, 618 N.E.2d 989, 995 (1993). 
Finally, the IELRB recognized that its decision finding the proposed unit 
appropriate did not end the matter. The Board stated that: “[w]hether the 
proposed bargaining unit is ultimately approved will depend on the desires of the 
employees, [who] [] will have the opportunity to express [their opinions] in the 
election to be conducted subsequently.”  The IELRB directed that a unit-preference 
vote be conducted among the employees. 
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B. Anti-Union Discrimination 
In Illinois Eastern Community Colleges Association v. Board of Trustees of 
Illinois Eastern Community Colleges, Case No. 2011-CA-0008-S (IELRB 2013), 
the IELRB affirmed the Recommended Decision of the ALJ that the complaint be 
dismissed because the Complainants failed to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination to discourage union activity. 
The events giving rise to this complaint began in early 2010 when the Employer 
compiled a list of twenty-seven employees for a reduction-in-force (“RIF”). The list 
included five employees who Complainants alleged were targeted for their union 
activity. Prior to the final determination by the Employer one of the five employees 
resigned from employment. In March, the Employer determined it would be 
necessary to lay-off twenty-one employees. All four of the remaining employees 
who Complainant alleged were targeted for union activity, were laid off. When the 
Employer recalled ten employees, none of the four were recalled. 
The IELRB Board analyzed the three elements of a prima facie case of 
discrimination.  The first element, that the employees participated in activity 
protected by the Act, was satisfied, and the Employer did not contest that 
assertion.  The IELRB found that that the second element of the prima facie case, 
that the employer was aware of the protected activity, was also satisfied despite the 
Employer’s exception with respect to two of the employees. The Board found that 
both employees were heavily involved with noticeable union activities. One was a 
member of the union negotiating team, and the other one was a treasurer for the 
union. 
The Board found that the third element of the prima facie case, that the employer 
took action to encourage or discourage the protected activity, was not satisfied. 
There was adverse action taken against the Complainants when they were laid-off, 
but the IELRB stated that the Complainants must also show that the adverse action 
was taken because of protected activity. The Complainants pointed to many 
instances of what they perceived as disparate treatment against employees heavily 
involved in the union, such as: not allowing one employee to teach summer school, 
requesting the same employee not be a union negotiator, and forcing another 
employee to teach at multiple campuses rather than just one. The IELRB 
determined that all instances provided, other than one, were too remote in time to 
show anti-union animus. In addition, the Board found that there was little 
evidence to show that union supporters were singularly punished for actions 
tolerated with respect to other employees. The Complainants also pointed to a 
prior history of grievances as proof of anti-union animus, but the IELRB stated 
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that a history of prior grievances or unfair labor practices is not enough on its own 
to show unlawful motive. The IELRB also rejected the Complainant’s contention 
that all four riffed union activists were not recalled as not establishing a prima facie 
case of discrimination because there was no showing of how active the others in 
the non-recalled group were or how active all the members of the union as a whole 
were when compared to the group the was not recalled. 
II.  IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Duty to Bargain 
In Midlothian Professional Fire Fighters Association, Local 3148, International 
Association of Fire Fighters and Village of Midlothian, 29 PERI ¶ 125 (IL LRB-SP 
2013) (Case No. S-CA-10-287), the ILRB State Panel held that the Village of 
Midlothian (“Midlothian”) violated IPLRA Section 10(a)(4) and (1) by bargaining 
to impasse on its proposal that employee discipline or discharge not be subject to 
the parties’ grievance and arbitration procedures. 
The parties had a collective bargaining agreement that provided Midlothian with 
authority to discipline or suspend employees for just cause.  The agreement also 
recognized the statutory authority of Midlothian’s board of fire and police 
commissioners to discipline employees, and it indicated it did not intend to 
diminish the authority of that entity.  During negotiations for a successor 
agreement, the Union made a proposal that would allow it to grieve, to arbitration, 
terminations or suspensions exceeding five days.  Midlothian rejected the proposal 
and the successor agreement included a just cause provision.  Subsequently, 
Midlothian became a home rule municipality and, during additional negotiations, 
Midlothian argued to the point of impasse that neither employee discipline nor 
discharge should be subject to the grievance procedure.  Instead, Midlothian 
adopted an ordinance prohibiting the removal or discharge of employees except 
for cause.  The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge. 
The ILRB noted that the primary issue in the case was whether the proposal made 
by Midlothian, a home-rule municipality, to have discipline considered by its board 
of fire and police commissioners and not pursuant to the arbitration provisions of 
the parties’ collective bargaining agreement concerned a permissive subject of 
bargaining.  The State Panel applied its decision is Village of Wheeling, 17 PERI ¶ 
2018 (ILRB-SP 2001).  The Board found that Village of Wheeling was sound and 
that subsequent legislative activity revealed an intent to broaden its applicability 
to include the instant matter. 
SPRING 2013 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT 27 
The State Panel noted that the statutory amendment at issue in Village of 
Wheeling, Public Act 91-650, was intended to “undo” an appellate court decision 
that held that a city is precluded from bargaining over matters that are covered by 
the Municipal Code.  The Board noted that its Village of Wheeling decision is 
based on the premise that any substantive term agreed to by the parties pursuant 
to their Section 7 bargaining obligation creates a statutory right to grievance 
arbitration pursuant to the contractual provision required by Section 8 in all 
circumstances, “unless [as Section 8 permits] mutually agreed otherwise.”  Thus, 
while the substantive matters affecting terms and conditions of employment 
bargained in Section 7 are mandatory, the Board in Village of Wheeling found that 
Section 8’s reference to the “mutual agree[ment]” to avoid arbitration on 
substantive matters was a permissive subject of bargaining. 
Moreover, the Board noted that the language in the Municipal Code relied on by 
the Village of Wheeling was amended in 2007 to the following (strike-outs show 
language stricken by the 2007 amendment and the italicized portion shows 
language newly added in 2007): 
§10-2.1-17. Removal or discharge; investigation of charges; retirement. Except as hereinafter 
provided in this Section, no officer or member of the fire or police department of any municipality 
subject to this Division 2.1 shall be removed or discharged except for cause, upon written charges, 
and after an opportunity to be heard in his own defense. The hearing shall be as hereinafter 
provided, unless the employer and the labor organization representing the person have negotiated 
an alternative or supplemental form of due process based upon impartial arbitration as a term of a 
collective bargaining agreement. Such In non-home rule units of government, such bargaining 
shall be permissive rather than mandatory unless the parties mutually agree otherwise. Any such 
alternative agreement shall be permissive. such contract term was negotiated by the employer and 
the labor organization prior to or at the time of the effective date of this amendatory Act, in which 
case such bargaining shall be considered mandatory . 
Further, the State Panel noted that the legislative history confirmed that the 
General Assembly intended to make the holding of Village of Wheeling universally 
applicable.  Specifically, the Board relied on a comment by Illinois Representative 
Dugan that stated that the 2007 amended Code provision was intended to create 
equal bargaining rights for all professional firefighters, regardless of whether their 
employer was a home rule municipality, a non-home rule municipality, or a fire 
protection district. 
B.  Supervisors 
On April 5, 2013, Governor Pat Quinn signed SB 1556 into law (Public Act 097-
1172), available 
at, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=097-1172, 
28 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT SPRING 2013 
which makes several changes to the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA). 
The bill was passed in the Senate on January 8, 2013, after passing the House back 
in May 2011, but the bill remained on the Governor’s desk for several months 
before he signed it in early April. The amendments to the IPLRA contained in the 
bill went into effect immediately. 
SB 1556 makes several changes to the IPLRA, each of which make it easier to 
exclude managers and supervisors from coverage under the Act and some 
provisions that give the Governor power to remove individuals from bargaining 
units. Under the IPLRA as now amended, state employees working under the 
Attorney General, the Comptroller, the Secretary of State and the Treasurer, that 
were certified in a bargaining unit on or after December 2, 2008, which a petition 
was filed with the ILRB on or after the effective date of SB 1556, or for which a 
petition is pending before the ILRB, now are covered by a much more narrow 
definition of “managerial employee.” The new definition no longer requires that an 
individual be “predominantly” engaged in managerial and executive functions to 
qualify as a managerial employee. Further, the definition was also expanded by 
adding language to exclude workers “who [represent] management interests by 
taking or recommending discretionary actions that effectively control or 
implement policy.” 
The bill also makes substantive changes to the supervisory exclusion for the same 
class of workers covered by the definitional change for managerial employees. 
These workers are now subject to the same standards used under the National 
Labor Relations Act, as the changes to the IPLRA explicitly reference the NLRA 
and relevant NLRB precedent. The changed language states that these employees 
will qualify as a supervisor based on “(A) Section 152 of the National Labor 
Relations Act and (B) orders of the National Labor Relations Board interpreting 
that provision or decisions of courts reviewing decisions of the National Labor 
Relations Board.” 
The amendments also limit which workers can be included in bargaining units by 
amending the definition of “public employer” to exclude the Office of the Governor, 
the Governor’s Office of Management and Budget, the Illinois Finance Authority, 
the Office of the Lt. Governor, and the State Board of Elections. 
Another important change made by SB 1556 was defining a new class of employees 
labeled “legislative liaisons,” which are also excluded from the IPLRA’s coverage. 
The Act defines legislative liaisons as “a person who is an employee of a State 
agency, the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the Comptroller, or the 
Treasurer, as the case may be, and whose job duties require the person to regularly 
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communicate in the course of his or her employment with any official or staff of 
the General Assembly of the State of Illinois for the purpose of influencing any 
legislative action.” 
Finally, one of the most significant changes contained in SB 1556 is the addition of 
Section 6.1 to the IPLRA, which gives the Governor the power to exempt up to 
3,580 positions in agencies directly responsible to him from the Act’s coverage. 
Out of this total number of positions that can be exempted, the Governor is able to 
exempt up to 1,900 that are already included in a bargaining unit; effectively giving 
the Governor power to remove employees added to bargaining units over the last 
several years. However, this provision of the Bill does include some limitations on 
the types of positions that may be exempted. The Governor has one year from the 
effective date of the amendatory Act to exercise the powers added by Section 6.1. 
